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The New Face of Humanitarian Aid and 
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China and Its Growing Role in the Realm of 
African Development
In November of 2013, Typhoon 
Haiyan struck the Philippines causing 
massive amounts of damage in terms 
of both property and lives. Winds were 
recorded at 195 mph and waves as high 
as 5 meters crashed onto shore.1 In 
response, the U.S.S. George Washington 
and the H.M.S. Illustrious, aircraft 
carriers of two of the five permanent 
U.N. Security Council members, the 
United States and the United Kingdom, 
were deployed to the Philippines with 
cargo holds full of supplies designated 
for humanitarian disaster relief.2 In 
addition to this force, regional support 
was promised from Japan, in the form 
of a large naval force and over US$ 30 
million. Yet the world’s second largest 
economy at the time and neighboring 
country, the People’s Republic of China, 
had initially only offered US$ 100,000.3 
A recent news report released by UNICEF 
shows that even after China increased 
its aid package to US$ 1.6 million,4 the 
Swedish furniture maker IKEA, was still 
donating a larger monetary donation to 
the Philippines relief effort.5 Why then 
is the Chinese aid package so small in 
comparison to the tens of millions of 
dollars donated by other countries, 
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Philippines and the ensuing criticism, 
which eventually lead to an increase, 
came forth by an international pressure 
to do so, not as a result of China’s 
willingness. When China does engage in 
the act of humanitarian aid, it is not out 
of pressure but rather out of a willingness 
to engage in a mutualistic agreement with 
the other nations; unlike the paternalistic 
agreement so often associated with the 
western humanitarianism model. They 
engage not in aid giving but rather in 
Humanitarian Diplomacy.
Mary Douglas, in the forward to Marcel 
Mauss’ The Gift writes, “There should not 
be any free gifts. What is wrong with the 
so-called free gift is the donor’s intention 
to be exempt from return gifts coming 
from the recipient. Refusing requital 
puts the act of giving outside any mutual 
ties…. For all the ongoing commitment 
the free-gift gesture has created it might 
as well never have happened…A gift that 
does nothing to enhance solidarity is a 
contradiction”.8 The act of humanitarian 
aid giving, in the traditional non-Mary 
Douglas sense, is a selfless act by both 
individuals and NGOs. It is not often 
that a quid pro quo arrangement appears 
in interactions between an NGO and 
those populations they are trying to help. 
While the type of aid being delivered can 
be controlled by both the NGO and 
the recipients, little is often specifically 
mandated to be returned as a form 
of payment or thanks. However, the 
smaller scale of individual donors and 
especially those countries that have a 
similar geo-political stake in the region 
like the United States and Japan? The 
real answer may never be known but 
this paper will attempt to shed some 
light on not only the reason for which 
the P.R.C. donated such a small amount 
but also and more significantly on how 
the P.R.C. determines when and where 
to use humanitarian assistance. 
The friction between China and other 
nations in eastern Asia is well known; 
over the past few years, territorial 
disputes over strings of islands have 
erupted between not only China and the 
Philippines but also between the Chinese 
and Japanese. Clashes over the ownership 
of the Nansha/Spratly archipelago in 
the South China Sea6 and the Diaoyu/
Senkaku islands (Chinese/Anglicized 
spelling) in the East China Sea are just 
two examples among the recent tensions 
between China and its neighbors.7 
China has always been fiercely defensive 
of its territorial claims, yet this attitude 
is not necessarily the reason why China 
gave what was considered a small aid 
package. The perceived lack of aid to the 
China’s reinvention of the 
distribution of aid serves as 
a notice to all states, that 
traditional western aid might 
just not be as beneficial or in 
demand as it once was.
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of Africa as a continent full of failing 
states needing social reform. China, on 
the other hand, is outperforming the 
success of western nations when it comes 
to aid, gaining both political allies as well 
as economic partners due to its ability 
to understand and deliver what Africa 
needs most. China has begun the process 
of transitioning the idea of ‘aid’ from the 
western norm of non-reciprocal charity 
donations to the now increasingly more 
evident and more mutualistic process of 
reciprocal aid giving and thereby China 
has become a much larger player in the 
realm of humanitarian diplomacy. China 
gave aid to the Philippines because it was 
what was required of the second largest 
economy in the world, not as a way of 
gaining favor from the Philippines. Yet 
old ways are fading. The new model 
will show that what dictates China’s and 
increasingly other nations’ aid giving, is 
the idea of what they, can gain- not from 
giving the gift, but rather from engaging 
in humanitarian diplomacy, in other 
words, using aid to increase relations and 
ties between the countries. 
organizations greatly differs from that of 
the macro level, the level at which states 
can act as both as donors or as recipients. 
It is important to note before going 
forward that there is a vital distinction 
between states and governments. The 
government of a country is a moral body 
composed of people that have feelings 
and emotions, while the state is defined 
by a lack of moral conscious; it has no 
feelings, and as such, states have the 
utmost desire to make humanitarian 
aid into a more reciprocal agreement. 
Traditionally, states have only used aid 
as leverage when addressing human 
rights issues. However, a new form of the 
reciprocal nature of humanitarian aid 
has been becoming more prominent and 
utilized by non-traditional donor states 
like China, who, in recent years has been 
on the forefront of economic growth 
and stability. It is predicated to become 
the world’s largest economy in the next 
decade, a feat it has met according to 
some sources, and its growing influence 
in the developing world has been scaring 
the traditional economic powerhouses.9 
Parallel to the growth of China, has been 
the rise in the importance both politically 
and economically of Africa. After massive 
colonization and then a period of rapid 
decolonization, Africa has just recently 
again begun to see a larger portion of 
the world’s attention, especially due 
to its abundance of untapped natural 
resources and industrial potential. 
Western nations traditionally view most 
A new form of the reciprocal 
nature of humanitarian aid has 
been becoming more prominent 
and utilized by non-traditional 
donor states like China, who, 
in recent years has been on the 




(Responsibility to Protect), arguing 
against humanitarian intervention and 
proposing the concept of “humanitarian 
assistance” as an alternative.14 While 
China eventually made concessions on 
the R2P doctrine, it still held considerable 
power when dealing with the issue of 
humanitarian intervention and aid, 
especially when Africa was involved.
The crisis in Darfur has been considered 
one of the worst humanitarian cases in 
recent years. While intervention seemed 
inevitable, China ensured that their 
principles of intervention would not 
be compromised when military action 
was ordered. China demanded that 
Khartoum had to consent before any 
operation took place and that consent 
be obtained via “a greater willingness [on 
the part of China] to use its influence 
over the Sudanese government to secure 
that consent”.15 China’s firm reluctance 
to move forward without the support 
of the Sudanese government not only 
Traditionally the People’s Republic of 
China has held very strong convictions 
on state sovereignty. Jonathan Davis, in 
his article “From ideology to Pragmatism 
China’s Position on Humanitarian 
Intervention in the Post-Cold War Era” 
argues that China’s position is a result of 
the frequent infringements on China’s own 
sovereignty during the first half of the 20th 
century. These included U.S. involvement 
in the Taiwan Straits and in Tibet, 
which eventually led to the principles 
included in the Chinese constitution as 
a part of the “Five Principles of Peaceful 
Coexistence”.10 However, as the author 
later explains, this policy was not set in 
stone; “… the PRC also began to develop 
a nascent policy on permissible foreign 
interventions including the position that 
target state consent was a sine qua non 
[an indispensable and essential action] 
for the legality of any intervention”.11 The 
policy on non-intervention continued 
to decline in prominence and support, 
until Tiananmen Square, when any 
trace of liberal views on sovereignty was 
squashed.12 However, while the actions 
of the government in response to the 
protests were summarily expressed by the 
West as being repressive, African nations 
quickly supported the acts, ending what 
had been a decade of neglect between the 
two.13 After a decade of little involvement 
in setting the reach and scope of 
humanitarian assistance (especially its 
role in the Gulf War), China became 
actively involved in the issue of R2P 
China also uses the peacekeeping 
missions as a logistical training 
tool for their army personnel, 
to acclimate them to working 
in different environments in a 
non-simulated setting, and to 
prepare them for future combat 
situations.
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that the persistence of African states 
“made possible” the recognition of 
the P.R.C. by the United Nations, and 
therefore the opportunity to become 
a member of the P-5 on the Security 
Council.19 In return for this acceptance, 
China has given a large amount of 
aid in a variety of forms to Africans 
states.20 While China’s involvement in 
humanitarian aid has grown in both scale 
and investment, the reason for which 
has not been one of altruism but rather 
realism. Li writes, “China’s main objective 
in Africa is to develop and nurture its 
geopolitical influence on the basis of a 
practical instrumental imperative that 
underpins its future growth through 
globalization”.21 This approach, while 
common in most forms of diplomatic 
arrangements, is uncommon in the 
environment of humanitarianism. Little, 
outside of human rights, has been asked 
for in return for aid or intervention, 
but China has decided to capitalize on 
this opportunity. While potentially seen 
as morally wrong, states have no use 
for morality and therefore can proceed 
to leverage their support for African 
intervention issues in return for positive 
relations and therefore growth. 
reflected their position on the scope and 
practice of humanitarian intervention but 
also thereby strengthened their relations 
with African nations. China’s role in 
intervention has not been limited to 
political agreements alone however. As of 
2007, China has sent more peacekeepers 
on UN missions than the United States, the 
UK and Russia combined, with missions 
in the African countries of Western 
Sahara (MINURSO), the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (MONUC), Sierra 
Leone (UNIOSIL), Ethiopia/Eritrea 
(UNMEE), Liberia (UNMIL), Sudan 
(UNMIS) and Cote d’Ivoire (UNOCI).16 
China uses its peacekeeping forces not 
only to foster good international support, 
but also to show physical support to 
African nations, in return for support in 
their ‘One China’ policy and especially 
their energy futures.17 China also uses 
the peacekeeping missions as a logistical 
training tool for their army personnel, to 
acclimate them to working in different 
environments in a non-simulated 
setting, and to prepare them for future 
combat situations.18 Having Chinese 
peacekeeping officers in Africa provides 
African leaders with not only contact to 
the Chinese military but also serves to 
strengthen relations between the country 
and the continent.
The strong rapport between Africa and 
China stems from the issue concerning 
the recognition of the PRC as being the 
legitimate ruling power of mainland 
China. Chairman Mao was to have said 
While China mainly seems to 
use the politics of humanitarian 
intervention as a means of 
diplomacy, humanitarian aid 
serves as an economic tool.
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therefore does not distinguish ODA from 
economic cooperation or investment 
as long as the intention is to build 
local capacity of recipient countries”.26 
What does this mean for the notion of 
humanitarian aid? Potentially it means 
that the monetary value of aid given as 
‘humanitarian aid’ is over-inflated, or, with 
economic co-operation now becoming 
a new form of humanitarian aid, it thus 
opens the category of ‘aid’ to entirely new 
routes of delivery. However, Chinese aid 
is not given solely for economic gain, or at 
least not initially. After decades of intense 
civil war, Angola began moving towards 
reconstruction in 2002. As financing 
this project would be impossible for 
Angola alone, the government turned to 
the IMF and the West, which agreed to 
conditionally finance the project as long 
as Angola “…adopt[ed] a staff-monitored 
programme (SMP) demonstrating good 
performance against certain criteria 
that would lend credibility to Angola’s 
economic policies”.27 Such stringent 
conditions and a constant big brother 
overseer would not have suited a project 
of this capacity and importance, in a war-
ravaged county. Pragmatically, China 
stepped in to negotiate an offer of aid 
under the conditions that a line of credit 
would be exchanged for 10,000 barrels of 
oil per day.28 The Chinese-Angolan deal 
offered the best of both worlds to the 
two nations, Angola received desperately 
needed cash flow that could be used 
without too many concessions and, as 
While China mainly seems to use the 
politics of humanitarian intervention as 
a means of diplomacy, humanitarian aid 
serves as an economic tool. However, 
such a statement is too one-sided; China 
is not the sole beneficiary of this aid. May 
Tan-Mullins in her article “Redefining 
‘Aid’ in the China-Africa Context” quotes 
Zambian economist Dambisa Moyo as 
being highly in favor of the style of aid 
China gives, “… the emergence of China is 
a ‘golden opportunity for Africa’, offering 
the continent a ‘win-win’ alternative to the 
scenario of an ‘aid-dependent economy’ by 
focusing instead on trade and investment 
and by providing the infrastructure 
that will enable Africa to ‘move up the 
development curve’ ”.22 While Western 
donors generally give cash, this practice 
creates, in Moyo’s argument, dependency 
on an influx of currency. China’s aid on 
the other hand is centered on “…discrete 
projects; the rationale being that projects 
are less prone to corruption and generally 
produce quick and tangible results”.23 To 
outsiders of this arrangement, i.e. western 
nations, Chinese aid is very hard to 
distinguish from other forms of economic 
assistance, as it lacks transparency, thus 
building on the fuzzy definition of what 
‘aid’ is.24 Up until the point when China 
became more active in ‘aid’ giving, aid or 
Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) 
was given a specific definition by the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development.25 However, as China 
does not use OECD definitions, it “…
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be very visible, which provides short-term 
tangible benefits.31 Lum also makes note 
of the difficulty of pinpointing the exact 
value of Chinese aid. It could range from 
US$ 1-2.7 billion as “aid” alone, but the 
“infrastructure financing” as estimated 
by the World Bank could bring the total 
close to US$ 7 billion, with this additional 
funding making up the majority of 
funds spent on railroads, roads and 
power projects.32 So why the interest in 
Africa? In addition to the strengthening 
of diplomatic ties, China hopes to gain 
many economic advantages, principal 
among these are oil and mineral rights.33 
Not only does oil play a key role in the 
world economy but also it now seems to 
play a key role in humanitarian aid.
While the search for greener, renewable 
energy sources is at an all-time high, 
the demand for oil has not been halted 
and the need to locate new sources of 
oil, whether undertaken by unearthing 
new oil fields or by expanding into 
untapped markets, is a must for any 
growing industrialized economy. This is 
especially the case for China if it hopes 
to sustain the same amount of economic 
growth that has propelled it this far in 
the past half century. The oil need may 
even have a bearing on issues that do 
not immediately seem related, such as 
that of various disputed islands. Both 
the Senkaku and Spratly islands hold 
significant military positions, with the 
Senkaku islands being positioned north 
east of Taiwan and close to Okinawa 
discussed later on, China received oil to 
help meet its growing energy demands. 
While the difference between the 
amount of aid China gives and that given 
by western nations is large, if one were 
to include economic investment into 
the calculation, there would be no large 
apparent differences. However, what 
differs between the aid or investment 
is what makes China’s aid all the more 
unique. Chinese economic assistance to 
Africa, which is growing rapidly, also has 
a unique focus. Apathy or in some cases 
tensions between some African nations 
and the West have sometimes prevented 
aid from being delivered. China, however, 
is not so boxed in by its poor relations 
in Africa. It “often promotes economic 
projects in countries, geographic areas 
and sectors that developed-country 
governments and multinational 
corporations have avoided because they 
have determined them to be unfriendly, 
too arduous or infeasible”.29 Lum, in his 
article published in the Congressional 
Research Service notes other impacts of 
aid to Africa that are relatively unique as 
compared to comparable levels of western 
economic assistance. He notes that 
Chinese aid is available to be used relatively 
quickly as it lacks most of the constraints 
that Western or OECD nations impose.30 
He also notes that many of the projects 
funded by Chinese aid are accompanied 
by summit meetings that symbolize 
friendship, and that the Chinese projects, 
like stadiums and cultural centers, tend to 
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In an article published in International 
Affairs, Ian Taylor describes the role oil 
plays in China’s attitude and actions 
towards Africa. The article, titled “China’s 
Oil Diplomacy in Africa,” begins by 
describing the mutual distrust held by both 
Africa and China of western nations. This 
distrust is founded upon the west’s intent 
to promote liberal democracy and human 
rights.39 Taylor notes that China uses this 
distrust to form a wedge between the west 
and Africa, thereby drawing China and its 
more similar views on human rights into 
the mix.40 The author notes that some 
take a simple view as to why China had 
to look to Africa for oil, stating, “Chinese 
companies must go to place for oil where 
American and European companies are 
not present”.41 However, this view can 
be seen as outdated when the nature of 
the Sino-African relationship is taken into 
account. Taylor writes that China is not 
the only gainer in quest for oil, noting that 
because Chinese oil companies are state-
run, they have the ability to outbid most 
competitors and in the process increase 
the profit margin of the African nations.42 
Yet, these trades for oil are not all good 
(good in the moral western sense). Oil for 
aid in Angola has helped consolidate the 
power of the dictatorial elites in Luanda 
by allowing the siphoning of funds, as 
China has a policy of ‘non-interference’.43 
The situation is worse in Sudan, where 
China has also been heavily criticized for 
its extensive arms deal and involvement in 
the civil war. While it is not the motivating 
allowing for greater naval monitoring 
of American, Japanese, and Taiwanese 
forces as well as lying in the middle 
of rich fishing grounds.34 The Spratly 
islands are even more contested by not 
only China and the Philippines but 
also by Vietnam, Taiwan, Malaysia and, 
Brunei.35 The Spratly, like the Senkaku 
sit in the middle of highly trafficked 
shipping lanes and could provide the 
Chinese navy with a base from which 
they could expand their ability to operate 
away from mainland China.36 Yet it is 
not the military access or fish that draw 
so many nations to these island chains. 
Rather, both the Spratly37 and Senkaku 
islands sit on what is believed to be large 
untapped undersea oil and gas fields, 
to which the owner would have access 
to millions of barrels.38 However, with 
so many nations in play and so much 
potential oil and revenue at stake these 
territorial disputes are unlikely to be 
resolved in the near future. China has 
therefore had to turn its sights to other 
locales, mainly those where oil is known 
to exist but has yet to be either fully 
developed or monopolized by other oil 
hungry powers, mainly the United States 
and Europe: in other words, Africa.
The West is further disadvan-
taged in its humanitarian aid 
and work in Africa by the ex-
change of people between Afri-
can nations and China.
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and MSF suspended operations47or 
upon principle, like when 10 NGOs 
including Oxfam, Save the Children UK 
and Care left southern Sudan in 2000 
over the issue of signing a memorandum 
which “among other things, demands a 
work plan from all NGO’s working in its 
areas and their budgetary provisions for 
their respective areas of work”.48
The West is further disadvantaged 
in its humanitarian aid and work 
in Africa by the exchange of people 
between African nations and China. 
Brian Sautman and Yan Hairong in 
their article note the significance the 
role of aid and development has had 
in China-Africa migration. They note 
that it occurs at levels that no western 
nation has reached; China sent “sixteen 
thousand medical personnel to Africa 
to develop hospital and clinics, and 
240 million patients have been treated 
by Chinese health care workers”.49 The 
migration is not limited to medical 
staff, agricultural products and factories 
have been constructed by thousands 
of Chinese agro technicians, including 
building a farm that provides a quarter 
of all the rice eaten by Tanzanians.50 
However, it is not just a one-way street, 
“Africans go to China to learn how to 
build the infrastructure themselves or 
how to work in it as doctors, teachers, 
and officials. Some sixteen thousand 
African professionals were trained in 
China between 2000-2006; fifteen 
thousand will do so in 2007-9”.51 
factor for China’s involvement in Sudan 
(that being greater access to the oil fields), 
the human right problems associated 
with the arms deals spoil the uniqueness 
and brilliance of Chinese ‘aid’.44 Despite 
such problems, China cannot be overly 
criticized for their strong relations with 
‘rogue nations’. In agreement with Lum, 
Taylor notes that,
In the short term, China’s trade 
with and investment in Africa are of 
assistance to the development of the 
continent, if for no other reason than 
that little investment is forthcoming 
from other sources. China’s investment 
in Africa’s crumbling infrastructure 
is needed and is welcomed by most. 
Throughout Africa, Chinese companies 
are occupied in building hospitals, 
dams, government offices and stadiums 
and refurbishing facilities abandoned 
by western companies. In addition, 
China’s demand for energy resources 
has inflated prices, bringing a windfall 
to African states’ income.45
China’s efforts are having a positive 
spin. As much as China can be 
condemned for its own human rights 
issues, not to mention those of the 
nations’ dependent upon Chinese aid, 
it is still effecting positive change. More 
traditional humanitarian aid projects are 
also being undertaken, hospitals are being 
built and facilities are being constructed 
in locations where western nations 
will not work, whether that refusal is 
based upon safety concerns for western 
staffs as was the case in South Sudan 
and Somalia, where in 2013 the Polish 
Humanitarian Organization (PAH)46 
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The first and less substantiated of the 
two is that China acts solely in its best 
interests, ensuring that any aid given 
yields some type of substantive return 
to the Chinese economy. The loans to 
Angola were only made to gain access to 
their oil fields or the pressuring of Sudan 
to allow in intervention forces was made 
to suit Chinese national policy. While 
these may be rational explanations for 
these events, another reason, used in 
conjunction or separately might express 
the justification of Chinese aid practices 
more thoroughly. China is still considered 
in the world’s socio-economic56 and 
political spheres as a developing nation.57 
As a developing nation, it is itself the 
recipient of large amounts of aid and 
economic development.58 A report 
created for the United States Congress 
lists United States’ foreign aid to China 
as being over US$ 330 million dollars 
from 2001 to 2012.59 Even Japan, 
China’s regional military and economic 
opponent, gave aid in the form of 
monetary assistance,60 nearly US$ 800 
million dollars’ worth.61 China places 
an emphasis on economic growth over 
economic stability, its standing on social 
issues is lacking, and politically, it is non-
democratic. These characteristics mirror 
those of many of the countries China 
sends aid to, a commonality that has 
not gone unnoticed. Max Rebol notes 
in his article, “Chinese Aid to Africa: 
Filling the Gaps that Others Left,” that 
when western nations transitioned to 
This transfer of people is not always 
temporary in nature. Sautman notes 
that in 2001 it was estimated that there 
was 137,000 Chinese people living in 
Africa.52 In 2011, that number had 
ballooned to one million people and 
that number is still climbing.53, Those 
professionals that are temporarily 
working in Africa are pressured to “live 
more like their African counterparts… 
enjoy[ing] the same living conditions as 
the experts of the recipient country”.54 
This approach to a more African style 
of living goes a long way in creating a 
less paternalistic relationship and sets 
the workers at a more equal level. Even 
compared to their western counterparts, 
Chinese workers earn less on average, 
live in more modest housing and work 
at less prominent jobs, like retail or 
farming.55 This requirement to live 
more like those that one is aiding 
represents China’s approach to aid 
giving in general, removing the pomp 
and circumstance and creating the best 
mutualistic relationship possible. 
Two plausible reasons as to why China 
acts in these manners vary from one 
another but are not mutually exclusive. 
China responds to the needs 
of African nations more 
appropriately than western 
nations do as China is more 
developmentally linked.
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items as cheaply as possible better 
than developing nations who are more 
concerned with protecting their own 
interests. In 2001, 92% and 68% of aid 
from Italy and Canada was tied, while 
loans from China were capped at 50%.66 
It comes down to China being in a more 
similar position to the African problems, 
so they can better understand the needs 
and complications that face their nations. 
The Sierra Leonean Foreign Minister 
put it best; “There is a difference, and 
it is huge. What [China] wants to help 
you with, is what you have identified as 
your needs. With Britain, America, they 
identify your needs. They say: ‘Look, we 
think there is a need here.’”.67 China is 
better suited, better equipped and more 
able to suit the needs of Africa when it 
comes to aid giving.
The traditional western perspective 
on humanitarian aid is that of feeding 
centers, hospitals and disaster relief. 
It is this western centric view that has 
partially allowed China to become 
such a player in Africa. China responds 
to the needs of African nations more 
appropriately than western nations do as 
China is more developmentally linked. 
China acts in accordance to the principle 
set forth by Mary Douglas and Marcel 
Mauss, gifts are contradictory if not 
returned by something else, whether it is 
for oil in the case of Angola or for closer 
ties that lead to more advantageous trade 
agreements, as the Chinese-Sudanese 
trade relations demonstrate. While 
social based aid from industrial aid, 
China saw an opportunity and ran with 
it, establishing 50 special economic 
zones.62 Being a developing nation, 
China did not have to worry about the 
same issues that concern developed ones. 
In 1994, USAID prohibited any foreign 
investment that would lead to U.S. job 
losses, investments that African nations 
desperately required to begin to expand 
their job markets and economy.63 To 
confront some of the problems that 
Western nations were facing with their 
aid system, they instituted the Paris 
declaration on aid effectiveness, which 
called for transparency and aligning donor 
interest with that of the recipients’.64 
China, not being a developed nation, 
had no requirement or need to agree 
to such a declaration and proceeded to 
operate in the same manner as they had 
been. To this issue of aligning interests, 
Rebol quotes Dr. Sesay, a former Sierra 
Leonean government minister as saying, 
“The Chinese will simply build a school, 
a hospital, and then supply a team of 
doctors to run it. The World Bank will 
say: ‘You must not have so many teachers 
on your payroll. You must employ some 
expatriate staff. You must cut down on 
your wages.’ The Chinese will not do 
this. They will not say ‘You must do this, 
do that, do this!’”.65 Another issue that 
arises is tied aid, funds that are required 
to be spent on goods from the donor 
nation. As a developing country, China 
understands the pressure of buying 
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developing nations not the size of its 
military. China offers the alternative 
to the liberal democracy and human 
rights agenda that western nations push, 
offering economic growth with little 
outside control. The success of China’s 
new ‘aid’ giving to Africa and it popularity 
within African states, must give some 
pause to all western humanitarians as to 
if they are actually doing their job as they 
should be. The old age of giving aid is 
over, and if this method is not researched 
further by western scholars, than China 
may corner the market on humanitarian 
diplomacy and shut out other nations 
from engaging in the same lucrative 
and relation building practices that it 
presently exhibits in Africa. 
the developed western nations and 
especially the OECD member nations 
seem shocked at the classification of 
Chinese economic development in 
Africa as aid, the question arises that if 
not aid, what then should it be called? 
Those that classify aid as being primarily 
geared towards social issues and disaster 
relief issues are neglecting the power 
created by having stable jobs and a 
growing economy and its effect upon 
a population. While China is seen as a 
military threat to many western scholars 
and nations (a valid view given China’s 
fierce defense and claims to islands in 
the East and South China Sea), its major 
confrontational aspect lays primarily in 
its economic ties and closeness to other 
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